Global and international environmental political economy

Authors

  • José Gpe. Vargas Hernández Instituto Tecnológico de Cd. Guzmán

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35197/rx.04.01.2008.06.jv

Keywords:

politics, economy, environment, global, international

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the current concept of environmental political economy from the understanding of environmental problems as evolutionary phenomena from instrumental rationality to political rationality. The perspectives of environmental economic policy from the voters or electors, interest groups and from the normative assessment of democracy are briefly reviewed, in order to subsequently find the rationality of environmental policy. Finally, the global and international environmental political economy is analyzed.

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Published

2008-04-30

How to Cite

Vargas Hernández, J. G. (2008). Global and international environmental political economy. Revista Ra Ximhai , 4(1), 83–118. https://doi.org/10.35197/rx.04.01.2008.06.jv

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 1 (2008): enero-abril

Section

Artículos científicos

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Copyright (c) 2008 José Gpe. Vargas Hernández

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