Moral hazard and signal transmission: analysis of the relationship between the pollero and the wetback from a macroeconomic perspective

Authors

  • Eliseo Díaz González El Colegio de la Frontera Norte

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35197/rx.05.01.2009.03.ed

Keywords:

migration, agency theory, negotiation, moral risk

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to analyze the negotiation that takes place between the immigrant who seeks to enter the United States illegally and the smuggler or pollero who will help him cross the border and eventually help him get hired on a farm or any other job in the northern country. Based on the risks involved in migration and the construction of the relationship between the migrant and the pollero, the market equilibriums that determine the price or rate of the migratory-labor services provided by the pollero to the migrant are analyzed, using the principal-agent theory and the signaling model, which, in the presence of asymmetric information, do not achieve the emptying of markets. The most important conclusion of the research is that the formation of markets that resolve the externalities generated by the migratory process and the implementation of actions to combat the phenomenon must be promoted.

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References

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Published

2009-04-30

How to Cite

Díaz González, E. (2009). Moral hazard and signal transmission: analysis of the relationship between the pollero and the wetback from a macroeconomic perspective. Revista Ra Ximhai , 5(1), 29–37. https://doi.org/10.35197/rx.05.01.2009.03.ed

Issue

Section

Artículos científicos